Next weeks War Studies Seminar at the Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham is as follows:
Dr Bob Bushaway
(University of Birmingham)
‘History and Memory: Turkish Memorialisation at Gallipoli’
The event will be on 31 January. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in Lecture Room 1, 1st Floor, Arts Building.
Scottish Independence – Who gets to vote?
While London and Edinburgh flex their symbolic muscles over who has the right to call a referendum for Scotland to leave Great Britain, I’ve been wondering about the practicalities of who gets the right to vote. Overlooking for a moment the SNP’s assumption that only Scots should be concerned with the matter of independence for Scotland, what no-one seems to yet be wondering is how ‘Scottishness’ should be defined. Nationality and identity are convoluted at the best of times but the potential end of the Union of Great Britain with this referendum makes the usual definer of nationality – passports – null and void, so forcing governments (whether in Edinburgh or London) to apply definitions of nationality that could prove controversial.
Will ‘Scottishness’ count as residence in Scotland for a certain number of years? This is how the SNP currently decide who gets free university education (currently set at three years residency regardless of nationality). Would then all the other nationalities that live and work in Scotland but don’t consider themselves Scottish be allowed to vote? Significantly, many who consider themselves Scottish but who live in other parts of Great Britain or the world would be excluded. If this is the definition chosen, residence will have to be set at longer than two years, or those wishing to affect the vote could begin residence now in time for the SNP’s suggested date of 2014. Also, how would residence be defined? Would PO Boxes, second homes or rented accommodation count?
Alternatively, should ‘Scottishness’ be limited to those born in Scotland or those with one or more parents or grandparents of Scottish birth? This would allow those Scots currently living abroad to vote and would follow the current pattern for parliamentary elections and referendums in which British subjects can register for proxy-votes or postal-votes. This is important as living and working abroad doesn’t mean a person doesn’t have an opinion or a right to voice that opinion in changes that affect their country.
Keeping this in mind, as the end of the Union would affect the remaining countries in Great Britain, should the people of those countries have an opportunity to voice their opinion? If not a right to vote in the referendum for or against Scottish independence, perhaps a parallel referendum could be held to establish whether the rest of Great Britain wants the Union to continue. Could there be any compromise if these referendums returned different results?
If we were to take a purist view (which I will because I think it’s an interesting, if somewhat academic, point), technically the people of Great Britain are British and ‘Scottishness’ as a nationality ended in 1707 with the Union Treaty. Therefore, if the SNP think only Scots can vote, perhaps potential voters should be found from those who 305 years ago had ancestors who were Scottish. Leaving aside the complications of defining nationality by residence (therefore including the Irish or English soldiers stationed in Scotland at the time of the Union) or birth (especially at a time when nationality was a vague and adaptable notion) this method of definition would provide a wider range of voters, including a significant number of people who, today, might not be considered or consider themselves Scottish – Prime Minister David Cameron and a large proportion of the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand amongst them. Besides the extra income that would be generated for unemployed historians in the quest to find Scottish family, this isn’t a practical idea, but technically accurate.
Ultimately, I think the definition of ‘Scottishness’ that will be adopted will depend on who wins the current power-struggle to decide when a referendum will take place, but I think it’s interesting that who will take part has largely escaped general interest.
I’d be interested to know who you think should have the right to vote.
Here is another abstract for one of the chapters from our forthcoming book. It is by Peter Randall of the University of Reading. Thoughts and comments welcomed.
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For the armies of continental Europe, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars constituted a seismic event, provoking a period of introspection and military reform and heralding the Napoleonic military revolution. By contrast, there was not a similar level of reform to the British Army.
This essay first sets out to examine the factors, which prevented reform, or made it undesirable. Britain’s individual situation was obviously important, as being an island with large colonial holdings across the globe the Royal Navy was of utmost importance for British grand strategy. Additionally, the task of colonial warfare and conditions outside Europe also made reform of the Army unnecessary. Additionally, the relationship between Parliament and the Army, and financial pressures reduced the possibility of reform, as did the influences of Horse Guards, the Duke of York and the Duke of Wellington. Finally, victory in the Napoleonic Wars acted to reinforce British bad habits.
With these barriers to reform in mind, the essay then takes the path less trod, and examines the changes that did come out of the Napoleonic Wars, both positive and negative: the bloated pay and pensions list; the growth of the Colonial Office and police forces; alterations to drill and tactics; and the modest growth of military publications.
Finally, the essay goes on to look at how these changes, or lack thereof, contributed to the experience of the Crimean War, and briefly evaluates the influence of this period in the post-Crimean reforms.
The British Army, 1795-1815: An Army Transformed?
Here is the first of the abstracts for our forthcoming book on transformation and innovation in the British military. All of the contributors are interested in your thoughts.
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‘The British Army, 1795-1815: An Army Transformed?’
Andrew Limm (University of Birmingham)
This essay questions the widely held view that the British army of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars underwent a transformation in the period 1795 to 1809. The catalyst for this transformation, as argued by a number of historians, notably Richard Glover, was the organisational and tactical reforms instigated by the Commander-in-Chief of the army, the Duke of York.[1] According to Glover et al, this transformation led to resurgence in the fortunes of the British army from 1795, enabling it to play a key role in the allied defeat of the French in the Iberian Peninsula and at Waterloo. This thesis has been accepted into the mainstream history of the British army, with the current historiography being dominated by studies of British successes, particularly the victorious campaigns of the Duke of Wellington.
Although the Duke of York’s reforms arguably brought about a transformation in the organisation of the British army, they did not lead to instant military success. Instead of achieving a series of continental victories against France in the period from 1795 to 1815, the British army was forced, by French domination of the continent, to conduct a series of difficult amphibious operations, mainly against the Low Countries. These expeditions often resulted in abject defeats for the British. Poor planning, limited manpower and reliance on unreliable intelligence combined to undermine British operations. Bad weather and poor quality inter-service cooperation were also factors in bringing about British defeats. Only in the Peninsula, under Wellington, did the British achieve continued military success, elsewhere the British army was largely unsuccessful.
This essay reviews the conduct of the British army in a number of expeditions, notably to the Scheldt in 1809, and concludes that its catalogue of defeats there, and elsewhere in the world, should add an element of caution to the claims that the victories in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, marked a transformation in the fortunes of the British army over this period.
[1] Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation, The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 12.
Air Power Seminar at the University of Birmingham – Ross Mahoney
The next War Studies Seminar at the Centre for War Studies at the University of Birmingham is an Air Power Seminar and is being given by:
(University of Birmingham)
‘Leadership Effectivness: Understanding a Key Metric of Operational Military History – The Case of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory‘
The event will be on 17 January 2012. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in Lecture Room 1, 1st Floor, Arts Building.
TOC – War in History, Vol. 18, No. 4
Here is the latest Table of Contents from War in History. It is good to see a couple of articles from Lecturers at the University of Birmingham in here. Some interesting articles as usual.
Hamish Scott, ‘The Seven Years War and Europe’s Ancien Régime’
Recent decades have seen a welcome revival of scholarly interest in the Seven Years War (1756—63). This has not been accompanied, however, by sufficient appreciation of the burdens imposed by the fighting and the enormous impact of these upon the states which were at war. Drawing upon the abundant recent scholarship, this article argues that the adoption of an international and comparative perspective, together with an extension of the time frame within which consequences are assessed, makes clear that the Seven Years War was decisive for the European ancien régime. It drove governments to adopt new policies and to introduce fundamental reforms, and in some states stimulated opposition to established political authority.
Robert Watt, ‘Victorio’s Military and Political Leadership of the Warm Springs Apaches’
Victorio is widely acknowledged as being one of the best guerrilla leaders of the Apache Wars during the 1870s and 1880s. Yet previous accounts of Victorio make little or no effort to demonstrate why he was such an effective leader. This article combines a knowledge of Apache warfare techniques and primary sources to argue that not only did Victorio demonstrate a mastery of these principles of guerrilla warfare; he also displayed an ability to introduce new techniques to further confound his opponents. As a result Victorio, with a small number of warriors, was able to defeat the efforts of US and Mexican armed forces to destroy him for almost a year before being trapped and killed at Tres Castillos, Mexico, by Chihuahua state troops. The article will also show that Victorio’s military skills were augmented by a keen awareness of the political weaknesses of his enemies. This analysis of Victorio’s military and political skills concludes that his popular reputation as a great Apache leader is richly deserved and should be acknowledged.
Spencer Jones, ‘Scouting for Soldiers: Reconnaissance and the British Cavalry, 1899—1914′
Although reconnaissance was considered the primary duty of cavalry, British cavalry were poorly trained in this role prior to the Anglo-Boer War (1899—1902). The dismal performance of scouting duties in this conflict prompted a complete overhaul of reconnaissance organization, while innovative training methods were introduced to improve scouting and horse-mastership. Although the process was not without difficulties, the results were positive and proved extremely valuable in 1914. It is the purpose of this article to add to the ongoing debate on British cavalry in the period 1899—1914 by demonstrating how the vital skills of reconnaissance were developed as a result of the Anglo-Boer War experience.
Simon Constantine, ‘War of Words: Bridging the Language Divide in the Great War’
This article explores the different ways in which soldiers in the First World War communicated with the enemy. Drawing, in particular, on accounts of capture and captivity recorded in interview with escaped and exchanged British prisoners of war, it argues that language was central to these experiences, and that a soldier’s ability to understand, and make himself understood, was often pivotal to the question of whether he survived or perished.
Martin Kragh, ‘Soviet Labour Law during the Second World War’
By studying Soviet legal practices, we learn about the enforcement of coercive legislation in the USSR. New archival data show how Soviet organs attempted to control labour in industry during the Second World War. State organs interacted in order to enforce legislation, but enforcement in practice was weak. Soviet leaders simplified administrative procedures for enforcement as long as the war threat persisted. So enforcement of coercive labour law was a priority during the war, but actual penalization was inefficient owing to various constraints.
Next weeks War Studies Seminar at the Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham is as follows:
Professor Jeffrey Grey
(Australian Defence Force Academy)
‘Reflections on the Impending Centenaries of the First World War’
The event will be on 22 November. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in Lecture Room 1, 1st Floor, Arts Building.
War Studies Seminar at the University of Birmingham – Kut 1916
Next weeks War Studies Seminar at the Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham is as follows:
(MoD)
‘Kut 1916’
The event will be on 15 November. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in Lecture Room 1, 1st Floor, Arts Building.
