It strikes me that when considering the possibility of success in asymmetrical war there’s a number of factors to consider: culture, aims and methods. History has kinda proven Mao wrong…ish. Bear with me during this example: The British in South Africa 1901-02 successfully subdued the insurgency by the Boer commandos but at a humanitarian cost unacceptable even by Edwardian standards. Importantly though, the Boers while driven by ideological factors were similar culturally to their imperial overseers. Thus, when losses were driven high enough the political will of the Boers broke. This can be tied to the aims, neither the Boers nor the British were fully committed to the absolute destruction of one another (although Milner did wish to Anglicize the Boer republics). In this respect the failed insurgency brought about a political compromise.

Mao (and others) seem to have a narrow view of politics being that of organised governance. The Taliban, if anything like Al Qaeda, will have their own political concerns not least that of the divisive suicide bombing of fellow muslims in the mosques and markets of Pakistan. Politics is not limited to democracy. Rather I suspect the real factor is a case of which side can maintain the political will for longer. Clausewitz and all that. To assess that, factors like cultural homogeneity and ideological support come into play. This clearly does not exist in Afghan between ISAF and Taliban forces, but it does exist between the Pakistanis, ANA and Taliban forces. I suspect in layman’s terms ‘it’s better coming from them than from us’. Ironic then that despite the failings of the ANA and local police it is they who’ll hold the key to bringing this conflict to a conclusion. If they can win the ideological battle, then we’ll win the war.

At present the Afghan COIN Centre, part of the Land Warfare establishment, is headed by a full colonel with a staff of about six to eight people. This one could argue, possibly demonstrates the level of priority given to the operations of this nature. In the long term certainly some victories, and not necessarily military ones, might be achieved. Health care and welfare benefits, education maybe, might be implemented in certain areas.

No one wants the long term, although the indigenous forces on both sides will wait out and see what happens, then as usual, they will decide whom they are going to fight and whom they are going to fight for, if they have any choice that is. That is the nature of things in Afghanistan.

As for territorial control, it is a pretty meaningless concept in this environment. The press may latch onto it on occasion because it is something that the public can understand, easy stuff like ‘take’, ‘pull out’ and ‘lose’ are ready if not realistic concepts; but I do not see the public as being interested any more than the press are in sending them an online message, one to the effect that there is a job to be done and it can be achieved like this, and it will take this long (or longer) because simply put (1) there is no UK political commitment to this unpopular war and (2) it is clearly unwinnable.

Successful transition might yet occur somewhere in the world but it is not going to happen here. And as for lessons learned being applied in future conflict? You’re an historian, you are trying to make me laugh aren’t you?

Afghanistan is now generally perceived as a futile, unwinnable quagmire, and nobody here really cares about the Afghan police, the Afghan elections or the welfare of the Afghan people; they just want their government to stop spending their taxes and their soldiers’ lives.

Any attempted education about the commitment needed to win a long war will be answered by a war-weary populace with “we shouldn’t be there in the first place” – which is not at this stage a useful thing to say, but remains a pertinent one.