Here is the book’s blurb taken from the Helion website:

Between 1792 and 1945, the character of warfare changed. Battalions standing shoulder to shoulder during the Napoleonic era gave way to the industrialised, modern armies of the First and Second World Wars. The organisation and operational methods of the major military powers dramatically altered during this period and the British forces were no different. From the transition of the Royal Navy’s ships to oil from coal to the creation of an independent air force in 1918, the British military pioneered key innovations that affected the character of war on land, sea and air.

To date, many commentators and historians have focused on contemporary debates or specific historical examples. A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military from 1792 to 1945 brings many of these debates together and forms a broader picture. The complexity of change in the British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force is explored in chapters drawing on new and original research. Examples covered include the British military performance in the Napoleonic Wars, the developments of the Army medical services in the late-nineteenth century, the Royal Navy’s introduction of the Whitehead torpedo in the 1870s, air power doctrine on the eve of the First World War, British Army reorganisation in 1918 and amphibious operations in the Second World War.

Spanning the period of both peace and war this ground-breaking survey illustrates the different drivers for transformation and innovation. Culture, technology, tactics, organisation, personality, doctrine, command and context have all shaped the speed and development of the British Forces. A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military from 1792 to 1945 shows that while it was neither a revolutionary nor a conservative organisation, the British military certainly evolved and reacted to the character of warfare in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; even if change, at times, did not come easily.

Here is a list of the books chapters:

Introduction by Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney and Stuart Mitchell

1. The British Army, 1795-1815: An Army Transformed? by Andrew Limm
2. ‘Forsaking the good cause’? The Changes and Obstacles in Reforming the British Army, 1815-1854 by Peter Randall
3. Resistance and Reform: Transformation in the British Army Medical Services 1854-1914 by Andrew Duncan
4. “The Most Resistless and Revolutionary Weapon of Naval Warfare that has Ever Been Introduced”: The Royal Navy and the Whitehead Torpedo 1870-1900 by Richard Dunley
5. The Thin Khaki Line: The Evolution of Infantry Attack Formations in the British Army 1899-1914 by Spencer Jones
6. Learning to Manage the Army: The Army Administration Course at the London School of Economics by Peter Grant
7. The Royal Navy’s Adoption of Oil Before the First World War by Martin Gibson
8. Naval Wing Good, Military Wing Bad? An Orwellian inspired analysis of British Aviation Doctrine, 1912-1914 by James Pugh
9. “Hopeless Inefficiency”? The Operational Performance and Transformation of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918 by Aimeé Fox-Godden
10. Vanishing Battalions: The Nature, Impact and Implications of British Infantry Reorganisation prior to the German Spring Offensives of 1918 by Simon Justice
11. From ‘Jock Column’ to Armoured Column: Transformation and Change in British and Commonwealth Unit Tactics in the Western Desert, January 1941 to November 1942 by Neal Dando
12. ‘Lessons Learnt’: The Royal Air Force, Operation JUBILEE, and the Transformation of Combined Operations, 1942-1944 by Ross Mahoney
13. British Aero-Naval Co-Operation in the Mediterranean and the Formation of RAF No. 201 (Naval Co-Operation) Group by Richard Hammond
14. Re-evaluation of Wartime Communications: British Despatch Riders and Communications Reliability during the Second World War by Sarah McCook

Epilogue – Military Transformation in Crisis: The Future of Britain’s 21st Century Armed Forces by Matthew Ford

More details here on the Helion website.

By Ross Mahoney, PhD Candidate, Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham

Professor Andrew Lambert

(King’s College, London)

John Terraine and the Naval History of the First World War

The event will be on 30 April 2013. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in the Large Lecture Theatre, 1st Floor, Arts Building (R16 on the campus map).

Decision in the Atlantic

Friday 17 – Saturday 18 May 2013

Department of War Studies, King’s College London

Organised by Global War Studies, the Society for Nautical Research and the Department of War Studies, King’s College London

In the history of warfare few campaigns have been as long, as complex or covered as large an area as the Battle of the Atlantic did in the Second World War. The contest for allied maritime communications began on the first day of the war in 1939 and continued until the German surrender in May 1945. On the seventieth anniversary of the climax of the battle, this conference aims to draw together international scholarship with a view to highlighting recent approaches to its study and the campaign’s emerging role in the wider historiography of the war.

Friday

1300-1730 – Welcome and Opening Remarks

Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, Naval Historical Branch & Marcus Faulkner, King’s College London

Chair: TBA

Nicholas Rodger, All Souls College, University of Oxford – Some Questions

Eric Grove, University of Salford – 1941: The First Turning Point

TEA

Chair – Richard Gimblett, Naval Command Historian, RCN

Marc Milner, University of New Brunswick – The Allied Victory of 1943: Tactical and Technological Triumph or Victory through Years of Plain Hard Work?

The Colin White Memorial Lecture

James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy (Ret.) – All Should be ‘A’ Teams: The Development of Group Anti-Submarine Escort Training in the British and Canadian Navies During the Atlantic Campaign

Saturday

Panel A sessions are held in the DWS Conference Room, 6th Floor

Panel B sessions are held in the Pyramid Room, 4th Floor

Session 1 0900-1030

A1 – Chair – Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, Naval Historical Branch

Ross Mahoney, University of Birmingham – ‘The Cinderella Service’: RAF Coastal Command, Organisational Culture and Cultural Adaption in the Battle of the Atlantic

Ben Jones, University of Porstmouth – The Fleet Air Arm and Trade Defence, 1939-1944

George Monahan, Suffolk County Community College, New York – Closing the Atlantic Air Gap: The Casablanca Conference and the Reassessment of Allied Antisubmarine Air Tactics

B1 – Chair TBA

Lars Hellwinkel – The German naval bases in France in World War II

Alexandre Moreli, Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro – Hidden Behind the War: The Battle of the Atlantic and the Anglo-American rivalry for military and civil air facilities in the Azores Archipelago

Martin Morgan, University of Southern Mississippi – Outposts in the Azores: Lajes Field, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Importance of Airpower to Allied Grand Strategy

COFFEE 1030-1100

Session 2 11-1230

Chair: Andrew Lambert, King’s College London

Kevin Smith, Ball State University, Indiana – Meat Exports, Wartime Multilateralism, and the Managerial Challenges Posed by the Battle of the Atlantic: Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard’s Response to America’s Changing Global Role

Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, Naval Historical Branch – Britain and the Approaching Shipping Crisis, 1942-1943

LUNCH 1230-1330

Session 3 1330-1500

A3 – Chair TBA

Harry Bennett, University of Plymouth – The other critical convoy battles of 1943: The Eclipse of the Schnellboot in the English Channel and North Sea

Russell A Hart, Hawai’i Pacific University – The Battle for the Atlantic Begins in the Baltic: The German Defense of the Baltic ‘Springboard’ for the Resumption of offensive U-Boat Operations in the Atlantic, 1944-45

Stephen Hart, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst – Dönitz’s Final Fling in the Battle of the Atlantic:” A Re-evaluation of the Development of the Kriegsmarine ‘Electro-boat’ Submarine Offensive and its Impact on German Military Strategy during 1945

B3 – Chair – Alessio Patalano, King’s College London

Antoine Capet, Université de Rouen – Fact and Fiction in Sink the Bismarck

John A. Rodgaard, United States Navy (Rtd.), Independent Scholar – Examining the Human Experience of the Battle for the Atlantic Through Fiction: Nicolas Monsarrat’s works depicting the Atlantic War

Thomas M. Dykes, Blakelock H.S. School, Oakville, Ontario – Battle of the Atlantic Student Initiative

TEA 1500-1530

Session 4 1530-1630

A4 – Chair – Marcus Faulkner, King’s College London

David Kohnen, US Naval War College, RI – Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy: Admiral Ernest J. King and his Headquarters, 1943-1945

Followed by Closing Remarks and Farewell

Attendance of the conference is free, however registration is necessary and the number of places is limited. These will be allocated on a first come first served basis. Should you wish to attend please contact Marcus Faulkner (marcus.s.faulkner@kcl.ac.uk). General queries may also be addressed to the coorganisers of the conference Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones on behalf of the Society for Nautical Research (malcolm.llewellynjones@btinternet.com) and Robert von Maier on behalf of Global War Studies (globalwarstudies@gmail.com).

N.B. The conference programme is correct as of 31st March 2013, however might be subject to last minute changes.

Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, ‘Defining Soldiers: Britain’s Military, c.1740–1815′

This article offers a critique of the methodology of military history. The question of what constitutes a ‘soldier’ is usually taken for granted, but history of Britain’s military between the wars of the 1740s and the end of the Napoleonic Wars suggests that current definitions are inadequate. By focusing on the themes of language, law and citizenship, life cycles, masculinity, and collective identity, this article proposes new ways of thinking about ‘the soldier’. In so doing, it suggests that military historians should rethink the relationship between the military and society, and engage further with the methodologies of social and cultural history.

Gervase Phillips, ‘Writing Horses into American Civil War History’

Anthropomorphism has generally been considered a fitter device for poets and writers of sentimental literature than for historians. Yet mankind has largely moved beyond the arrogant dismissal of our fellow creatures as soulless machines, a divine gift for us to exploit without thought for their suffering or pain. Historians might now recognize that their, conventionally, most anthropocentric of disciplines needs to understand those animals that have contributed so much to shaping our past, to think with them and credit them with a perspective. Here, taking up the challenge laid down by the historian of the South African War Sandra Swart, an examination of the methodological issues surrounding the ‘writing in’ of animals into military history will identify an established tradition of ‘subaltern studies’ within the historiography of war, which has prepared the ground intellectually for the inclusion of non-human animals. Following this, a consideration of the experiences of horses during the American Civil War, informed by both contemporary records and modern equine science, will then demonstrate both the possibility, and the desirability, of according due attention to ‘animal soldiers’ in the writing of military history.

Nikolas Gardner, ‘Charles Townshend’s Advance on Baghdad: The British Offensive in Mesopotamia, September–November 1915′

This article examines Major General Charles Townshend’s offensive against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia during the autumn of 1915. It challenges the prevailing view that the offensive was destined for failure due to the numerical superiority of Ottoman forces in the region. Examining Townshend’s role in the battle of Kut-al-Amara in late September 1915, and focusing in particular on his conduct of the battle of Ctesiphon in late November, the article argues that Townshend was confident that his 6 Indian Division could defeat the Ottomans at Ctesiphon, and he devised a feasible plan to do so. Townshend’s decisions under fire, however, undermined the success of his force and contributed to the heavy casualties that led to its withdrawal from the battlefield and its subsequent retreat to Kut-al-Amara, where the division was besieged until its surrender in April 1916.

Marie Coleman, ‘Military Service Pensions for Veterans of the Irish Revolution, 1916–1923′

In 1924 the Irish Free State government passed legislation to award pensions to veterans of the Irish revolution and Civil War. This article argues that the motivation for the pensions was the need to placate the national army after a failed mutiny in 1924 and that this explains their unusual nature in being based on service alone rather than disability. It will also explore the problems this created for defining service, examine the extension of eligibility to former republican enemies of the state and women revolutionaries in 1934, and describe the application and assessment procedure.

Christopher E. Goscha, ‘Colonial Hanoi and Saigon at War: Social Dynamics of the Viet Minh’s ‘Underground City’, 1945–1954′

Because much of the existing literature on the Indochina War (1945–54) remains focused on its diplomatic and military aspects, scholars have tended to overlook the transformative impact of this violent war of decolonization on the Vietnamese city ‘down below’. This article shifts our view of the Viet Minh’s war against the French in this direction by exploring how the colonial cities of Hanoi and Saigon were a vital part of the rural-based Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s war and state-building efforts. Of particular concern are two socio-economic phenomena and one related military one. On the economic front, the colonial city exported badly needed manufactured goods, electronic products, people, and medicines to the isolated and unindustrialized guerrilla state. Second, in order to build ‘underground cities’, to connect them to the maquis state, and to obtain and export hard-to-find materials, the Viet Minh cultivated a complex set of social relations going into and out of the cities. Third, these social relations involved civilians from the start, which was essential to the DRV’s ability to transform the colonial city into a major battle zone first in Hanoi, then in Saigon. The urban–rural divide was never a sharp one during the Indochina War.

Articles

Claire Robertson, ‘Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean’

This article suggests that racism was a strategic military liability in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century wars between Britain and France in the Caribbean, wars which, ironically, coincided with the rise of abolitionism in both nations. The French Revolution, meanwhile, had provoked slave uprisings on many of the Caribbean islands. The article focuses on the actions of General Sir John Moore, Captain Thomas Southey, and Governor Victor Hugues, whose supposed abolitionism was contradicted by their belief that blacks could not govern themselves or be proper soldiers without white leadership. Their actions are contrasted with those of Sir John Jeremie, whose non-racist abolitionism cost him his career. Thus, both the British and French underestimated the black rebels’ capabilities and routinely executed black prisoners of war rather than ransoming or imprisoning them. These tendencies made Caribbean campaigns longer and bloodier than they might otherwise have been.

David J. Fitzpatrick, ‘Emory Upton and the Army of a Democracy’

Historians have long contended that Emory Upton (1839–81) was a “militaristic zealot” whose anti-democratic ideas caused generations of U.S. Army officers to sink into “Uptonian pessimism,” a belief that democracies were unable to manifest a coherent military policy. This essay argues otherwise. First, it contends that Upton was not a militarist and that he intended his reforms to protect democracy, not undermine it. Second, it argues that the U.S. Army officer corps in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not mired in pessimism, Uptonian or otherwise.

Katherine C. Epstein, “No One Can Afford To Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History before World War I’

Historians overwhelmingly agree that the U.S. Navy changed dramatically between the early 1880s and World War I, but few have asked how the “New Navy” of this era planned to fight its battles. This article seeks to recover its ideas about battle tactics, using torpedo development as a point of entry. Although officials thought seriously about torpedoes’ tactical implications, technological complexity and habits of institutional communication hindered the navy’s ability to agree on them, and important questions remained unresolved on the eve of World War I in 1914.

Tim Cook, ‘Grave Beliefs: Stories of the Supernatural and the Uncanny among Canada’s Great War Trench Soldiers’

The Great War’s No Man’s Land and the trenches that faced into it, with destructive weapons ruling the space, created a dislocated environment that spawned stories of death and haunting. The Canadian soldiers’ belief systems were robust and varied, but some men embraced the magical, uncanny, and supernatural to make meaning of their war experiences. An attempt to locate and situate these ‘grave beliefs’ within soldiers’ narratives brings to light an understudied aspect of the cultural history of the war.

Alex Souchen, ‘The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, June–August 1944′

This article explores the collective impact of information sharing, social interaction, and cultural expression on the morale of Canadian soldiers in the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division during the Battle of Normandy in France during World War II. It finds that battalion newspapers played an important role in supporting unit morale in three ways. First, they stimulated interest in unit traditions and folklore. Second, they defended unit morale against German psychological warfare tactics. Finally, they provided soldiers with a coping mechanism, as the songs, poetry, and humorous anecdotes helped them to express a cultural identity and construct meaning from the traumatic experience of war.

Ken Young, ‘Special Weapon, Special Relationship: The Atomic Bomb Comes to Britain’

Post-1945 U.S. war planning assumed that a strike on the Soviet Union would be prosecuted by B-29s flying the atomic bomb from forward bases in East Anglia, England, where in 1946 bomb preparation and loading facilities were established at disused airfields. In 1950, atomic-capable aircraft, complete with bomb components, were first deployed to England, amidst anxieties about sabotage and a pre-emptive Soviet air strike. This establishment of a U.S. atomic strike capability in England arose from an entirely informal arrangement based on mutual trust. That informality would soon engender concern in Britain as the lack of symmetry in Anglo-American atomic relations became more apparent.

Christopher Tuck, ‘Cut the bonds which bind our hands’: Deniable Operations during the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1963–1966′

In 1966, Britain triumphed in a little-known low-intensity war against Indonesia. Orthodox assessments of what was known as the ‘Confrontation’ have lionised British achievements during the campaign, especially the role played by Operation Claret: a campaign of secret, deniable cross-border operations. This article argues that, in fact, British deniable operations were extremely problematic and, indeed, increasingly unpopular with senior military officers. The argument highlights, in particular, the re-occurrence of a perennial problem in the use of military force: the difficulty in measuring during campaigns the extent to which tactical- and operational-level military successes actually translate into strategic political success.

Steven A. Fino, ‘Breaking the Trance: The Perils of Technological Exuberance in the U.S. Air Force Entering Vietnam’

A survey of U.S. Air Force air-to-air armament from World War II through Vietnam’s Operation ROLLING THUNDER reveals the institution’s focus on developing advanced technologies and tactics designed to thwart hordes of Soviet bombers. Challenged by nimble MiGs over Vietnam, the service was reluctant to investigate “low-tech” armament solutions. When the value of a gun in air combat was finally acknowledged, the Air Force elected to field it as part of an integrated weapons system on the F-4E. In the interim, pilots at DaNang air base cobbled together an inelegant but effective air-to-air external gun system. The episode reveals the significant potential, and fragility, of unit-initiated tactical innovation and the peril that can arise when an organization’s technological exuberance obfuscates less technologically-appealing solutions.

Document of Note:

Earl J. Catagnus, Jr., ‘Infantry Field Manual 7-5 Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion (October 1940)’

FM 7-5 Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion, published in 1940, has yet to be used by historians of the interwar U.S. Army. Written under the supervision of its primary contributor, Major General George A. Lynch, the U.S. Army’s Chief of Infantry, this field manual prescribed tactics, techniques, and procedures similar to those of the vaunted German army. The excerpts were chosen as representative of the nature of the military intellectualism underpinning the document.

Review Essay:

Patrick J. Speelman, ‘The Logistics of British Naval Supremacy in the Age of Sail’

Fred L. Borch, ‘Lieber’s Code: A Landmark in the Law of War But Not Lincoln’s Code’

This book provides a series of battlefield walks around the beaches and airborne landing sites and drop zones of Normandy. It has one walk each for four of the five landing beaches, two walks for Juno beach, and half a dozen other walks covering sites like Pegasus Bridge and the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc.

Each walk is prefaced by a short but detailed account of what happened in the area on the fifth and sixth of June. Reed clearly took some care composing these pieces, and many of his sources, which are conveniently footnoted for anyone who cares to pursue them, are primary documents or published accounts written by participants. The text contains nods to historiographical debates, which suggest that his primary research is backed by a wide secondary reading. These vignettes focus on individuals within particular units, and thus provide a better connection with the day’s events than a more impersonal account of a brigade or a division reaching a given line by a certain hour. They set up the walks very well, giving the reader an intimate and blow-by-blow account of what took place in their surroundings.

The walks themselves are equally good. The book’s introduction offers advice on travelling to Normandy by various means such as where to buy local maps, what to wear, and what to expect from the weather. The individual walks suggest the best places to park, and then give clear directions about which trails, roads and paths to take, what to look out for along the way, and notes on how long each walk is likely to take. The descriptions of longer walks suggest good places to eat locally, and any local museums or other sites, like cemeteries, are noted and their opening hours listed. The walks are intended to be more or less circular, or at the very least to avoid covering the same ground twice and they take in almost all of the locations mentioned in the histories which precede them. In some cases, structures have since been demolished, and Reed takes care to note instances where the terrain and the local environs have changed since 1944. He also highlights any buildings of note that are not open to the public, areas of private land, and bunkers which retain their original armament or are open to the public. In short, the sections describing each walk are well written with clear, systematic instructions, and notes on the local area calculated to be most useful to a visitor.

It is an excellent book that would serve well in its intended duty as a hand-held guide. It’s also well worth a look for anybody who isn’t planning a visit to Normandy in the near future, but simply looking for some well-written work on the initial engagements of the Allied return to France.

Citation: Andrew Duncan, ‘Review of Paul Reed, Walking D-Day’, Birmingham “On War”, 31 March 2013

You can download a copy of the review here.

This is an account of three tours in Iraq, spread over the duration of the war. The author was with one of the infantry battalions that took part in the initial invasion and immediate occupation in 2003-4. He then returned to Baghdad during 2005-6 when the security situation was worsening by the day and the country was slipping into civil war. He was then there at the end of the US occupation, being with one of the last units to withdraw to Kuwait in 2010. Thus, Colonel Darron L. Wright is able to give an account, from personal experience, about the periods of the war that typically garner the most attention; the initial invasion and the descent into chaos and internecine bloodshed. However, he is also able to discuss the process by which the US slowly overcame the difficulties it had created for itself and the outcome of US tactical and operational reforms.

As history, of course, such memoirs and personal accounts should be treated cautiously. In this case, Wright makes only occasional mention of where he drew his material from, mostly when he quotes from orders or other official documents, but with regard to his record of daily events and combat, it is unclear if he is relying on memory, a personal diary, or some other source. The strengths of this book are what might be expected; the immediacy of the first person narration and the personal impact of events, the unfolding of the war on the ground day by day, and some intriguing insights into the mind-set of the US Army before and during the conflict.

The weaknesses of the book are also those of the genre; a focus on one set of events in one locality, personal criticism of other figures committed to print, and a lack of perspective on other actors, events and processes that were also at play. Wright devotes several pages to attacking Thomas Ricks, journalist and author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (2006), largely on the basis that he was not actually there and thus did not understand the situation. Oddly, Wright attacks Ricks for making some of the same criticisms of US tactics, heavy-handed, aggressive, and counterproductive that Wright has already acknowledged as true. Wright also has a few things to say about some senior officers in his chain of command and about US political leadership. Many of these criticisms may be valid, but some are pursued more in the vein of a vendetta than balanced debate.

The book is written in direct and punchy prose, with occasional flashes of emotion, typically when he writes about his family or the soldiers under his command. The matter-of-fact style suits the book; some of the efforts at rhetorical flourish could have done with more intervention that is editorial.

Wright includes a short introduction, prior to the invasion in 2003, covering the First Gulf War, aspects of US Army training and doctrine, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 20001, which is noteworthy in itself. He notes that he kept two laminated photos back-to-back in his helmet during his first tour, with his family on one side and the Twin Towers on the other, to remind him ‘the reason why I was fighting in this God-forsaken country.’ Based on the unit he was due to join, he anticipated being sent to Iraq, even while President George W. Bush spoke in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Given that, Iraq had nothing to do with the attacks, or with sponsoring them, the link that Wright draws between the attacks and the invasion of Iraq is rather odd. This is especially so because, in connection with the supposed reason for the attack, he makes clear more than once that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, and hadn’t had any for quite some time prior to the invasion.

Some of the most noteworthy portions of the book are the reflections Wright makes on US mistakes, both political and tactical. On the subject of President Bush’s now infamously-premature declaration of the end of ‘major combat operations’ and ‘Mission Accomplished’, Wright records his disgust, and the disgust of his soldiers. He writes that his definition of major combat operations is simple: is he being shot at? If he is, ‘it makes sense to bring all assets to bear, such as attack aviation and field artillery’, a glimpse at the aggressive and firepower-heavy reactions instinctive to the US Army, which caused them such trouble in the conflict’s early years (p. 23).

He gives an unvarnished account of his unit’s actions, including their aggressive responses to initial violence and disorder in Iraq after the invasion. In response to an attack on their base in Baldah during Fourth of July celebrations, they sealed off all exits to the town, entered and searched every house in the town, detained every man of military age, and then marched more than 150 blindfolded and handcuffed captives at gunpoint to their base for interrogation. He notes that this was little different to what had taken place under Saddam’s dictatorship, except that such events typically ended with the captives disappearing forever, and that his unit’s actions gave the Iraqis cause to fear this was happening again. After interrogation, all but three of the men were released, and those who attacked the base were never found. Wright notes that at the debriefing after this operation, all discussion centered on the tactics and the message sent out, with all parties being happy with the level of violence and the way the unit responded to attack.

He freely acknowledges that ‘in our eyes nothing was too extreme. We were at war, and our goal was to save the lives of U.S. soldiers. We spared no expense and took no chances’ (p. 92). Only later, he writes, did the strategic ramifications of such actions dawn on the US Army. Even then, he sounds an apologetic note, that the unit had done ‘nothing illegal or immoral—nor did we violate the ROE [rules of engagement] or any other laws of war’ (p. 87).

Having admitted the errors of the early years, both of his own unit and those of the Army and its senior leadership, both civil and military, he gives a good description of how the army developed and inculcated new tactics and doctrine for the situation. His account of the training his unit was put through prior to their final deployment, and the civilian support and liaison teams employed in ‘nation-building activities’ that joined them in Iraq, and the work that they did, serves to show just how differently US troops operated in 2010 compared to the first few years of the war. The training featured great efforts to be accurate to current Iraqi conditions, from the tactics and frequency of insurgent attacks, to mock villages that looked realistic, complete with live goats and chickens. Troops practiced not only tactical exercises, but also dealing with angry crowds and handling local leaders who spoke no English. The success of the next and final tour in Iraq was the dividend of this training. Wright is candid about his errors and the lessons that he learned something that personal accounts are not always known for. Nevertheless, in some cases, his openness is surprising not only because of what he admits, but because of his attitude to it.

His account of a patrol throwing two Iraqi captives into the Tigris, rather than taking them to base for questioning, is instructive, although it makes for uncomfortable reading. One of the men allegedly drowned; Wright implies that little or nothing was done to investigate the truth of this, apparently on the basis that it was not worth the effort. He states explicitly that the patrol’s actions were ‘a strategic lapse in judgment’, but then describes his senior officer’s decision to attempt a cover-up, and writes that he agreed with this decision at the time, and ‘most likely would have made the same decision had I been in command’ (p. 147). This can be neither defended nor excused on the grounds of being ‘neither illegal nor immoral’ as it is flagrantly both. What may be most telling is that Wright wrote all of what he did and saw fit to publish it.

Reviewed by Andrew Duncan, PhD Candidate, Centre for War Studies, University for Birmingham

Citation: Andrew Duncan, ‘Review of Colonel Darron L. Wright, Iraq Full Circle: From Shock and Awe to the Last Combat Patrol in Baghdad and Beyond’, Birmingham “On War”, 25 March 2013

You can download a copy of the review here.

 In 1992, Michael Paris noted that the:

origins and early years of aerial warfare is a subject frequently ill-served by its historians … [with] … the tendency of many writers to focus undue attention on the individual combatant – to dwell at great length on the romantic icons of that first war in the air.^[1]

In the words of John H. Morrow, this ‘“Knights of the Air” … approach robs World War I air power of its genuine military and industrial significance.’^[2] For, as Lee Kennett suggests, elite pilots, such as Berthold, were a tiny minority amongst flying personnel.^[3] Thus, there is a tension within the literature, and, whilst professional academics continue to bemoan the focus on the individual, aviation historians such as Peter Kilduff continue to produce biographies of the elite pilots of the First World War such as Hermann Goring and Carl Degelow. Jeremy Black perceptively notes that the prevalence of the military biography is determined largely by commercial concerns.^[4]

Whilst a product of this wider fascination with aces and their exploits, Kilduff’s Iron Man is an interesting study that merits careful attention from the academic historian. Of course, it must be stated that Iron Man is driven by a narrative approach that spends significant time exploring the circumstances in which Berthold built his large total of aerial victories; this is particularly noticedable in Chapters 5 and 6. It is not an academic biography in the mould of Smith’s Mick Mannock (2000), but Iron Man has some obvious strengths.^[5]

In the first instance, the depth and extent of Kilduff’s research means that the author is able to provide significant insights that explore the social and psychological aspects of serving as a fighter pilot in the German Air Service of this era. These factors – the sociological and the psychological – are some of the least understood aspects of air power during the First World War.^[6] Little is known about the social background of flyers, the process of recruitment, and the training that they underwent. Even less is known about the psychological strains of flight and the manner in which air services managed the mental health of their pilots.^[7] For example, there is no equivalent in the historiography of First World War air power to studies such as Courage in Air Warfare (1995) or Cream of the Crop (1996).^[8]

Kilduff’s second chapter, which explores Berthold’s life prior to the outbreak of war, provides vital context to demonstrate the social and educational influences that helped shaped a generation of young Germans and their wider attitudes to warfare. In many respects, Iron Man provides a useful point of comparison for other biographical/autobiographical accounts of the conflict, including Sagittarius Rising (1936) and No Parachute (1968).^[9] Such comparisons are particularly pronounced in terms of the services cultures of the Royal Flying Corps and the German Air Service; another area in desperate need of research. More generally, by exploring the career of Berthold, Kilduff is provided with a useful vehicle to explore wider trends in aerial warfare. Notably, Iron Man traces the wider evolution of air power strategy, tactics, and technology in Chapter 4.

Another aspect of Iron Man that reflects a more general phenomenon relates to Kilduff’s engagement with the wider historiography. He provides a useful bibliography (pp.185 – 188), but key academic studies on the development of German air power during this period are missing; the work of Morrow, James Corum, and of J.R. Cuneo are perhaps the most notable absentees.[10] It seems that aviation historians tend to rely upon the work of other aviation historians, whilst academic air power historians tend not to make use of the work of aviation historians such as Franks or Kilduff.

When approaching the work of aviation historians, it is important to recognise that the goals of such studies might not be in keeping with the agenda of those pursuing academic research in the context of Higher Education. Kilduff’s work is a case in point, and whilst his narrow focus provides further evidence for the warnings and frustrations of Paris, Morrow, and Kennett, there is useful material to be mined from Iron Man.

Reviewed by James Pugh, PhD Candidate, Centre for War Studies, University of Birmingham

Citation: James Pugh, ‘Review of Peter Kilduff, Iron Man – Rudolf Berthold: Germany’s Indomitable Fighter Ace of World War I’, Birmingham “On War”, 25 March 2013

You can download a copy of the review here.

Professor Gary Sheffield

University of Birmingham

‘Douglas Haig: the Making of a Corps Commander’

The event will be on 12 March 2013. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in the Large Lecture Theatre, 1st Floor, Arts Building (R16 on the campus map).

Details can also be found on our Facebook page here.

Dan Wittingham

King’s College London

‘Charles Callwell and the Planning, Execution and Aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign’

The event will be on 5 March 2013. The Seminar meets on TUESDAYS at 5.30 p.m. in the Large Lecture Theatre, 1st Floor, Arts Building (R16 on the campus map).

N.B. Please note that this event replaces the planned talk by Dr John Bourne.